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1EXTENDING PREDATION ANALYSIS TO MONOPOLIST’S BUNDLED DISCOUNTS UNDER 
SECTION 2: AN ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
INTRODUCTION 
In LePage’s v. 3M,1 the Third Circuit decided the first case at the federal appellate 
court level that dealt with the subject of bundled discounts by a monopolist under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act2 in the period following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation.3 Prior to the decision 
in Brooke Group, the Third Circuit4 had only once before addressed this topic in 
Smithkline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Company.5 Smithkline is only significant because it 
nearly suggested that any bundled discount, regardless of whether above or below cost, 
was anti-competitive.  At the time of Smithkline in 1978, the Third Circuit had therefore 
not even considered monopolist bundled discounts with regard to products in the same 
relevant market as constituting a very serious legal issue.6 Following Brooke Group,
however, practitioners believed that this state of affairs had changed.  It is only well in 
the aftermath of Brooke Group, following the LePage’s Inc. v. 3M decision, that this 
issue has become the subject of vigorous debate.7
1 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2002), vacating LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 277 F.3d 365 (3rd Cir. 
2002), cert.  denied 3M v. LePage’s Inc., 542 U.S. 953 (2004).  
2 Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:  
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. . . . 
 Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. S. § 2 (2004) 
3 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (defining the 
predatory pricing standard for Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Pateman Act).  
4 The Third Circuit is the only federal court of appeals to have ever addressed this issue.  
5 Smithkline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3rd Cir. 1978).  
6 Id. at 1057 (“The major question for decision is whether the district court . . . erred in defining the 
relevant product market. . . .”).   
7 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Glazer and Brian R. Henry, Coercive v. Incentivizing Conduct: A Way Out of the 
Section 2 Impasse?, ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 49 (contending that Brooke Group required the Court in 
LePage’s to reach a different result than it would have without Brooke Group); James A. Keyte, LePage’s 
v. 3M – More Questions than Answers for the Lawful “Monopolist,” ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 27 
2In Section 1, this Article explores how the Third Circuit should have decided in 
Lepage’s and provides an answer to what should be the proper U.S. jurisprudence with 
regard to this issue in light of Brooke Group and U.S. economic theory.  In Section 2, this 
Article proceeds to question this ideal U.S. jurisprudence by providing an EC 
comparative perspective.  In doing so, this Article tries not to laud one standard over the 
other, but to precisely understand the philosophies, advantages, and disadvantages that 
underlie each system beyond the veil of law and economics.  
1. ABOVE-COST DISCOUNTING IN THE U.S. 
1.1. Smithkline:   Bundled Discount Law Prior to Brooke Group 
Smithkline and Eli Lilly were both pharmaceuticals manufacturers in the relevant 
market of the “nonprofit hospital market for a class of antiobiotic drugs known as 
cephalosporins” in the United States.8 Eli Lilly first produced, patented, and 
monopolized a drug branded by the name of Keflin and known generically as cephalothin 
in 1964.9 Subsequently, it manufactured four other cephalosporins, branded and known 
generically by the names of Keflex (cephalexin), Loridine (cephaloridine), Kafocin 
(cephalexin), and Kefzol (cefazolin).  Kefzol, or cefazolin in the generic, was the only 
one of Eli Lilly’s cephalosporins that was not patented.10 Eli Lilly continued to enjoy 
total dominance11 in the market from 1964 until 1973, at which point other 
manufacturers, namely Smithkline, produced cephalosporin drugs.12 
(highlighting the analytic schism between the majority and the dissent in LePage’s over the application of 
Brooke Group).  
8 Id.
9 Id. at 1059.  
10 Id.
11 See id. at 1065 n. 15 (showing that the Smithkline Court estimated that Eli Lily controlled between 
89.8% and 100% of the cephalosporin market between 1964 and 1973).  
12 Id. at 1059.  
3Beginning in 1973, Smithkline began to produce a drug branded by the name of 
Ancef and known generically as cefazolin.13 Cefazolin was identical to Eli Lilly’s 
Kefzol.14 After Smithkline began marketing Ancef, Eli Lilly responded by augmenting 
its pre-existing quantity-based discount program,15 known as the Cephalosporin Savings 
Plan (“CSP”), to include a percentage rebate that applied only when hospitals bought 
minimum quantities among any three of Eli Lilly’s cephalosporin products.16 All of the 
bundled discounts thus related to a relevant market in which Eli Lilly was a monopolist.  
Before reaching its final conclusion, the Smithkline Court noted a policy-like 
concern that Smithkline’s Ancef and Eli Lilly’s Kefzol, both cefazolin products, were 
superior in quality to Eli Lilly’s other monopolized products in the cephalosoporin 
relevant market.17 It then held that Eli Lilly had monopolized under Section 2 on the 
basis of its obvious power to exclude and its “willful acquisition and maintenance of 
monopoly power,” which was satisfied because the bundled discount linked a product 
that faced competition, Kefzol, with products that did not face competition.18 As a result, 
a “competitive” market for Ancef and Kefzol was replaced by a “non-competitive” 
market, since Smithkline would be unable to equal Eli Lilly’s 3% rebate without offering 
a 16% rebate.19 
13 Id.
14 See id. (noting that Kefzol and Ancef were both licensed by a Japanese developer).  
15 Compare Western Parcel Express v. UPS, 190 F.3d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that volume 
discounts are categorically legal because they do not “preclude competition in violation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act”) with Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶768b2, at 148 (2d ed. 2002) (suggesting that 
continuously increasing volume discounts or conditioning them on a one-year period could be 
anticompetitive under the Sherman Act, since they would preclude equally efficient competitors of the 
discounting firm from matching prices). 
16 Smithkline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (3rd Cir. 1978).    
17 Id. at 1061.  
18 Id. at 1065.  
19 Id.
4Although Smithkline potentially suggested that any bundled discount was anti-
competitive, one must identify facts that might limit the scope of this monopolization 
conclusion.  First, the bundled discount took place entirely within one relevant market, 
cephalosporins.  Second, under the bundled discount, sales within a competitive 
submarket were linked to a monopolized submarket, thereby maintaining not only a 
monopoly, but a dangerously inferior one in light of the Court’s policy calculation.  
1.2. Brooke Group:  The Emergence of Above-Cost Discounting Jurisprudence  
Brooke Group Ltd. and Brown & Williamson were both olgiopolist tobacco 
manufacturers.20 Since Brooke Group’s market share in the general cigarette market had 
severely declined, it innovated the marketing of generic cigarettes in order to bolster its 
market share.21 By 1984, Brooke Group had achieved 97% market share in the generic 
segment.  
 Brown & Williamson, who until 1984 had only manufactured branded cigarettes, 
was particularly affected by Brooke Group’s generic cigarettes innovation.22 In response 
to its eroding market share, Brown & Williamson produced its own generic cigarettes 
lines and provided wholesalers with volume discounts23 on them that made its wholesale 
 
20 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 212 (1993).  
21 Id. at 212, 214.  
22 Id. at 214 (noting that 20% of converts to Brooke Group’s generics came from Brown & Williamson, 
which had only had 11.4% of the market for branded cigarettes).  
23 Volume discounts are considered anti-competitive when the product so discounted is fungible, as was the 
case with respect to the two company’s generic cigarettes in Brooke Group. See Phillip E. Areeda & 
Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION,
¶768b2, at 149 (2d ed. 2002).  Nevertheless, despite the fact that such a discount threatened to eliminate a 
competitor, the Court relying on Brown Shoe, held that there was no harm to competition, since there was 
no evidence of recoupment.  This suggests that, by analogy, in Section 2, the definitive inquiry goes more 
to the issue of recoupment than to exclusionary conduct.   
5prices cheaper than Brooke Group’s generic cigarettes.24 Retail prices remained the 
same.25 
Brooke Group, in turn, responded with deeper discounts in the area of wholesale 
rebates.26 This led to a price war between the two firms where Brown & Williamson 
likely sold below cost.27 Brooke Group then brought a lawsuit against Brown & 
Williamson, alleging price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act.  Brooke 
Group alleged that discounting below cost would forced it to raise the list price of its 
generic cigarettes so as to effectively narrow the gap between prices in the branded and 
generic markets. 28 
In analyzing this claim, the Court first noted that Brooke Group had alleged a 
predatory pricing scheme to harm a competitor, which it analogized to a Section 2 claim 
under the Sherman Act.29 In order to prevail on this claim, Brooke Group had to show 
“’a reasonable possibility’ of substantial injury to competition. . . .”30 This meant 
showing both pricing below cost as well as a reasonable probability of recouping 
profits.31 
In announcing the below cost prong of predatory pricing, the Court stated very 
broad principles that suggested that low prices never threatened competition unless they 
 
24 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 215. 
25 This suggests that the Court’s holding in Brooke Group in favor of the discounting firm does not rest on 
assumptions about end user consumer gains.  See id.
26 Id. at 216.  
27 See id. at 216, 231 (noting that a reasonable jury could conclude that Brown & Williamson priced below 
cost).  
28 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 217 (1993). 
29 Id. at 220.  
30 Id. at 222.  The Court also stated that the Robinson-Patman Act demanded a broader reading of 
competitive injury than Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  See id. at 229 (noting that competitive injury under 
the Robinson-Patman Act extends beyond the monopoly context).  The Court noted that in the Section 2 
context, the standard was “’a dangerous probability of actual monopolization.’”  Id. This suggests per se 
liability for a monopolist who predatorily priced.  
31 Id. at 223-24.  In the context of the Sherman Act, the Court noted that one would have to show a 
“dangerous probability [] of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”  Id. at 224.  
6were below predatory levels, regardless of the type of antitrust injury alleged.32 Although 
the Court did assert the possibility of anti-competitive discounting above the predatory 
level, it suggested that such discounting was “beyond the practical ability of a judicial 
tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price 
cutting.”33 These points are both critical because they threaten to overrule the Matsushita 
framework for discounting, which focused entirely on the certainty and degree to which 
the discounter could recoup.34 
Given the Brooke Group Court’s definition of predatory pricing, one might 
deduce that low prices only threatened competition in a cognizable sense when a) prices 
were below cost;35 b) there was a reasonable or dangerous probability of recoupment; and 
c) discounting and probability of recoupment, or predatory pricing as a whole, threatened 
competition, or in the Section 2 context, monopolization.36 
On the other hand, in the next paragraph, the Court very obliquely implied that 
these broad principles might be tied to a particular context and a particular logic, 
 
32 For example, the Court cited Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990).  
Atlantic Richfield held:  “Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long 
as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition . . . . We have adhered to this principle 
regardless of the type of antitrust claimed involved.”  Id. at 340.  
33 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993). 
34 See Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1985).  Under a rationale 
that is entirely focused on recoupment, a monopolist that discounts will be per se liable under Section 2, 
assuming that there are no competitors to enter the market upon elimination of the monopolist’s 
competitors.  See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 
(1981) (asserting that a would-be monopolist must maintain its monopoly power a sufficiently long time in 
order to recoup).  This, however, is not true under a standard that requires below cost pricing.  See R. Bork, 
The Antitrust Paradox 145 (1978) (suggesting that the future flow of profits would exceed the discount 
only for a would-be monopolist who was able to maintain position).  The below cost discounting prong in 
Brooke Group also casts doubt on the remand instructions in Matsushita that would allow a competitor to 
show that a discounting plan was “economically senseless.”  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597-98.  Such 
evidence would only go to the question of recoupment. 
35 There is considerable disagreement among lower courts over the appropriate measure of cost.  The 
Brooke Group Court did not answer this issue, since the parties agreed on average variable cost.  See 
Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223. 
36 This deduction applies the elements of the Court’s predatory pricing definition combined with its rule 
that predatory pricing must injury competition or lead to monopolization.  See id. at 222-25.  
7potentially suggesting that its principles could extend no farther than the oligopoly 
context:  
Even in an oligopolistic market, when a firm drops its prices to a 
competitive level to demonstrate to a maverick the unprofitability of 
straying from the group, it would be illogical to condemn the price:  The 
antitrust laws then would be an obstacle to the chain of events most 
conducive to a breakdown of oligopoly pricing and the onset of 
competition.37 
The Court then noted that in the oligopoly context the consumer should not be 
denied the benefit of the lower price in the short run even if the ultimate effect is to 
“induce” supracompetitive pricing, the reasoning of which potentially might apply to 
monopolies.38 However, one must realize that this statement presupposed a situation 
where oligopoly pricing could potentially break down.  Thus, based on the principles of 
Brooke Group, competitive pricing should be, as a matter of law and policy, non-
cognizable only when both discounting may break down monopoly pricing and when 
consumers39 may experience gains.   
 In addition, the above analysis regarding the applicability of predatory pricing 
claims in the oligopoly context to any discounting in the monopoly context bears another 
caveat.40 The Brooke Group Court asserted that the pre-requisites to recovery were so 
difficult, in part, because lowering prices was not only the mechanism of predatory 
 
37 Id. at 223. 
38 Id. at 223-24. 
39 Consumers should not be understood to mean only end users.  In Brooke Group, despite the price war for 
wholesale business, the list price itself never changed.  See infra text accompanying note 25.  
40 One might argue, as the LePage’s Court, that there is also a serious issue regarding the applicability of 
predatory pricing to claims relating to discounting scenarios when predatory pricing is not asserted.  See 
LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 151 (3rd Cir. 2003) (en banc).  Regardless of whether there is one 
market or multiple markets, the economic rationale of Brooke Group would apply well in the oligopolistic 
context.  In this context, a decrease in price could always tend to at least immediately increase competition.  
Furthermore, nothing in the Brooke Group opinion suggests that this case is conceptually limited apart 
from its general economic rationale and its discussion of the oligopolistic context.   
8pricing, but of stimulating competition.41 The cost of wrong judgments regarding 
predatory pricing was therefore high.  In the context of a monopoly, however, the cost of 
a wrong judgment is arguably lower.  A decrease in price cannot tend to increase 
competition to the same extent where little to none exists.   
1.3. Ortho Diagnostic Systems:  Above-Cost Bundled Discount Analysis #1 – Toward a 
Showing that Monopolist Price was Below Competitor Cost 
Abbott Laboratories manufactured certain blood assays.  These were: 1) HBsAg; 
2) HBc or Anti-Core; 3) HCV; 4) HTLV; and 5) HIV – 1/2.42 Abbott alone 
manufactured all five of these commonly used assays and it possessed monopoly market 
shares in all of these five relevant markets, with the exception of HCV.43 Abbott’s 
overall market share in assays was approximately “70 to 90 percent.”44 Ortho Diagnostic 
Systems was a competitor to Abbott.  It only widely offered three of the above tests, 
HBsAg, Anti-Core, and HCV.45 
In the fall of 1992, Abbott concluded a contract with the Council of Community 
Blood Centers (“CCBC”), a group of blood donor centers that constituted a large 
percentage of potential assay customers.46 The relevant features of the CCBC were as 
 
41 Id. at 226 (“The mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing – lower prices – is the same 
mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition; because cutting prices in order to increase business 
often is the very essence of competition. . . .”).   
42 Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
43 Id. at 458, 459 n. 3 (showing Abbott’s market share percentages in the five assays).  
44 Id. at 459.  
45 Id.
46 See id. at 458 (noting that the Red Cross and CCBC members together accounted for 85-90% of the 
blood gathered by blood donor centers).  
9follows.  First, the contract was for three years.47 Second, discounts were given to 
customers that agreed to purchase either four or five assay products.48 
This lawsuit arose when Ortho alleged, inter alia, under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, that Abbott had used its monopoly power to effectively force CCBC members to buy 
Abbott assays.49 Specifically, Ortho asserted that since it did not widely manufacture 
HTLV and HIV – 1/2, CCBC members would have to buy these products from Abbott 
and in turn would be coerced50 into purchasing the other three types of assays from 
Abbott.51 This is because the CCBC could not have afforded to forego the discount on 
the other three products once they were already roped into purchasing Abbott products.  
The Court proceeded to analyze this as follows.  First, it cited Griffith52 and 
Berkey53 for the broad proposition that while a monopolist could not “employ the power 
derived from a dominant position in the market,” it could “utilize the advantages of 
size.”54 In the context of discounting or pricing, the Court suggested that a firm used its 
dominant power as opposed to its size when it drove “its competitors out of business with 
the intention thereafter of using its market power to restrict output, raise prices, and 
recoup the losses sustained in the competitive battle and then to enjoy the fruits of 
monopoly profits in the future.”55 
47 Id.
48 Greater discounts were given to those who purchased five assay products than four assay products.  No 
discounts were given to those who purchased less than three assay products.   See id. at 460.  
49 Id. at 463 (“The first [claim] asserts that Abbott had monopoly power in one or more of the alleged 
markets for HBsAg, Anti-core, HTLV and HIV – 1/2 sold to BDCs and that the package pricing features of 
the CCBC contract unlawfully maintained that power.”).  
50 But cf. Glazer & Henry, supra note 7, at 45 (making an argument that bundled discounts that give 
genuine discounts are not coercive, but incentivizing, and thereby give consumers better prices and choice).  
51 Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
52 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).  
53 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979).  
54 Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. , 920 F. Supp. at 465.  
55 Id. at 466.  
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Economically, this meant that below cost pricing definitely ran afoul of Section 2 
of the Sherman Act.  “The reason is plain:  below-cost pricing, unlike pricing at or above 
that level, carries with it the threat that the party so engaged will drive equally efficient 
competitors out of business, thus setting the stage for recoupment at the expense of 
consumers.”56 Thus, the Ortho Court viewed the below cost prong of Brooke Group as 
representing something akin to a qualification of judicial economy and nothing more.57 
For this reason, it found Brooke Group inapplicable in the bundled discount 
context, where it was possible for a competitor who bundled discounts to eliminate a 
more efficient competitor.  This could be accomplished, for example, in a two-product 
situation when the discount on a second purchased product exceeded the extra efficiency 
of the second competitor.58 Under this line of analysis, “the fact that the components of 
Abbott’s package all are priced at or above variable cost [was] not alone fatal to Ortho’s 
Section 2 claims.”59 However, since Abbott’s assays were priced above Ortho’s costs, 
there was no threat to eliminating an efficient competitor and thus no threat to 
competition in this particular case.60 
1.4. Concord Boat:  Non-Bundled Fidelity Discounts  
Brunswick Corporation was a manufacturer of stern drive engines, which it sold 
to boat manufacturers.61 Unlike Brooke Group, Brunswick was a monopolist.  It 
possessed 75% market share in 1983.62 
56 Id.
57 This view is not entirely consistent with Brooke Group, the rationale of which was rather the fact that 
cutting prices was broadly the engine of competition and narrowly the means by which consumers could 
enjoy the interim competitive fruits of an oligopoly world.  See infra Section 2.2.  
58 For a more elaborate hypothetical, see Ortho, 920 F. Supp. at 467.  
59 Id. at 468.  
60 Id. at 469.  For a discussion of how this concept should be incorporated as an element of Section 2 
discounting analysis in the above cost pricing context, see infra Section 2.5.  
61 Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2000).  
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In 1984, Brunswick began offering a discounting program to boat manufacturers 
for stern engines.  This program consisted of three types of discounts, discounts for multi-
year contracts, volume discounts, and market share percentage63 discounts.64 Neither of 
these programs contained exclusive dealing requirements, since “none of the programs 
restricted the ability of builders and dealers to purchase engines from other engine 
manufacturers.”65 
The boat builders who bought the stern engines from Brunswick subsequently 
brought a lawsuit, contending, inter alia, that the discount programs were an attempt to 
exclude competitors and that it enabled Brunswick to charge supracompetitive prices in 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.66 Specifically, they argued that the discount 
killed competition at the stern engine level, since Brunswick had effectively placed 
“golden handcuffs” on the boat manufacturers that effectively kept them from dealing 
with other engine manufacturers.67 The Court accordingly framed the usual Section 2 
inquiry as whether Brunswick had possessed monopoly power in the relevant market and 
whether that monopoly power was willfully maintained through anticompetitive 
conduct.68 
The Court, like the Brooke Group Court, first proceeded very broadly.  It cited the 
already mentioned principle of Atlantic Richfield, cited by the Brooke Group Court, that 
 
62 Id.
63 Market share percentage discounts happen where a seller discounts by a certain percentage in exchange 
for the customer accepting to buy a certain percentage of its market share.  See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶768b2, 
at 148 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that market share discounts are less likely than quantity discounts to price 
discriminate against customers).   
64 Concord Boat, 920 F. Supp. at 1044.  
65 Id. at 1045.  
66 Id. at 1060.  
67 Id.
68 Id.
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“low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set. . . .”69 It further 
noted, again citing Atlantic Richfield that in the absence of predatory prices, losses 
stemming from pricing “cannot be said to stem from an anticompetitive aspect of the 
defendant’s conduct.”70 Finally, it discussed the aforementioned concern in Brooke 
Group that Courts could not efficiently distinguish legitimate conduct from hocus pocus 
price cutting claims.71 Largely based on these principles, the Court arrived at “the 
general rule that above cost discounting is not anticompetitive.”72 The Court thus had no 
difficulty concluding that cutting prices was a sufficient business justification under 
Section 2, particularly since there were no exclusive dealing contracts.73 
This case is significant in discounting jurisprudence because it is the first court of 
appeals case to find that even a monopolist could engage in heavy discounting that 
encompassed a wide array of discounting schemes, including a market share scheme, 
provided that there were no exclusive dealing contracts and that pricing was above cost.  
However, this case, like Ortho, is arguably inconsistent with Brooke Group. At a 
minimum, it pushes the limit of Brooke Group, since existing monopolists who discount 
do not increase competition to the same extent.74 On the other hand, Brooke Group 
equally asserted the Atlantic Richfield proposition that the below cost pricing prong 
 
69 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990); See supra text accompanying 
note 33.  
70 Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1061 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Atlantic Richfield,
495 U.S. 328 at 340-41).  In the light of Brooke Group, it is extremely difficult to maintain that above cost 
pricing is predation, since below cost pricing is now an element of predatory pricing.  See supra text 
accompanying note 35. 
71 Id. at 1062.  
72 Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1061.  The Court claimed to arrive at this rule based on Matsushita as well as 
Brooke Group. Although Brooke Group may reasonably suggest this rule, Matsushita does not allow such 
an inference.  See supra note 35.  
73 Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1062-63 (defining exclusive dealing contracts very strictly).  
74 See supra text accompanying note 41.  
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applies to all antitrust violations.75 One might thus conclude that the Eighth Circuit in 
Concord Boat was the first court of appeals to resolve a fundamental tension in Brooke 
Group in favor of extending application of its predation standard to monopolies.  
1.5. LePage’s 
3M manufactured Scotch tape as well as its own brand of private label tape called 
“Highland.”76 Until the early 1990s, it had a market share above 90% in transparent tape, 
which was the relevant market encompassing both private label and branded tape.77 
LePage’s manufactured its own brand of private label and possessed an 88% market 
share in private label tape in 1992.  Its overall market share in transparent tape was a 
comparatively low 14.4%.78 
In 1993, 3M began a program called the “Partnership Growth Fund”79 with which 
it offered bundled discounts to LePage’s customers.80 The bundled discount program not 
only provided considerable rebates, but spanned six lines of products, set target growth 
rates for each product, and required that all requirements be met upon penalty of losing 
the whole discount.81 The six lines of products that it spanned were: health care products, 
home care products, home improvement products, stationery products (including 
transparent tape), retail audio products, and leisure time products.82 
75 See supra text accompanying note 33.  
76 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 144 (3rd Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
77 Id. Private label tape refers to “tape sold under the retailer’s name rather than under the name of the 
manufacturer.”  Id.
78 Id. at 161.  
79 The program was originally called the “Executive Growth Fund.”  Id. at 154.  
80 Id. at 154, 165.  The LePage Court further asserted that the discounts “induced [customers] to eliminate 
or reduce their purchases of tape from LePage’s.”  Id. at 154.  
81 Id.
82 Id.
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By 1997, LePage’s market share in transparent tape had dropped to 9.35%, a 
decline of 35%.83 LePage’s then brought a lawsuit, alleging, inter alia, that 3M’s bundled 
discount program violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, since “3M maintained its 
monopoly by stifling growth of private label tape and by coordinating efforts aimed at 
large distributors to keep retail prices for Scotch tape high.”84 
The Court began its analysis by highlighting certain broad legal principles that 
have been established throughout the history of Section 2 of the Sherman Act that related 
to the meaning of “willfully acquired or maintained” power by monopolists, since 3M 
was clearly a monopolist.85 First, Alcoa86 suggested that a monopolist could not keep 
growing if entering competitors could not succeed.  Second, American Tobacco noted 
that competition was essential and that neither exclusion nor intent was necessary for 
Section 2 liability.87 Third, Lorain Journal held that although it was generally lawful to 
refuse to deal, this is not so when a monopolist does with the intent to eliminate a 
competitor.88 More broadly, it suggested that monopolists who have an evil intent might 
be liable under Section 2 for otherwise benign conduct, particularly where the malignant 
effects on competition were readily foreseeable.  Fourth, Grinnell had held that mergers, 
non-competition covenants and pricing practices (which subsidized non-monopolized 
geographical areas with profits from monopolized geographical areas) could not be 
lawfully employed to achieve monopoly status.89 Fifth, Aspen implied that a monopolist 
could not even refuse to cooperate with competitors where there was a deliberate intent to 
 
83 Id. at 165.  
84 Id. at 144-45.  
85 Id. at 146 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966)).  
86 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).  
87 American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781 (1946).  
88 Lorain Journal Co. v. U.S., 342 U.S. 143 (1951).  
89 U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).  
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discourage rivals, absent a clear efficiency justification.90 Finally, Kodak held that a 
monopolist could not engage in exclusionary action to leverage an existing monopoly 
into another market.91 
Overall, the Court’s purpose in synthesizing these principles was to communicate 
that Section 2 jurisprudence in discounting cases cannot be simplistically reduced to a 
Brooke Group predation analysis, “a decision that was primarily concerned with the 
Robinson-Patman Act, not §2.”92 This was because 3M’s principal and only serious 
defense was the Brooke Group notion that “‘[a]bove-cost pricing cannot give rise to an 
antitrust offense as a matter of law, since it the very conduct that the antitrust laws wish 
to promote in the interest of making consumers better off.’”93 Against this argument, the 
Court was attempting to explain that one non-monopolist case that did not even take 
place in the confines of Section 2 could not suggest a principle that conflicted with nearly 
one hundred years of Sherman Act jurisprudence. 
The applicability of such broad principles is unclear, since none of them 
specifically relate to the discounting context.  One could therefore on this basis alone 
conclude that such principles are not definitive, since there are cases such as Matsushita 
and Brooke Group that are more analogous, monopoly context or not.  As noted above, 
Brooke Group suggested that above cost discounting, which gives customers better prices 
in the short run, should categorically be allowed in the monopoly context if it generally 
presented a possibility of stimulating competition or if courts would be unable to 
generally distinguish between pro-competitive and anti-competitive above cost 
 
90 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).  
91 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).  
92 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 151 (3rd Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
93 Id. at 147 (citing appellant’s brief at 30).  
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discounting.94 The question, then, is whether and when discounting in the monopoly 
context would ever have the potential to break down the monopoly structure, or at least to 
arguably break it down that the judiciary should end its inquiry as a matter of economy.  
Areeda & Hovenkamp assert that in the monopoly context “anticompetitive 
effects [from discounting] are only likely when the large firm can offer a larger variety of 
products or services than the smaller firm does.”95 This is clearly the situation at hand in 
LePage’s. The economic fear is that equally efficient smaller competitors that could 
match the discount on one product alone will be foreclosed from the market.   
However, Areeda & Hovenkamp never maintain that anticompetitive effects 
necessarily result from a monopolist’s bundled discounts.  Thus, one might argue under 
Brooke Group that bundled discounts may have the potential to break down the 
monopolist’s structure.  Notwithstanding this possibility, the rationale of Brooke Group 
does not appear to hold very well when anticompetitive effects are likely.  This is 
especially true if the judiciary is capable of distinguishing procompetitive from 
anticompetitive effects in the monopoly context.  However, since bundled discounting is 
the only context where anticompetitive effects are likely, in other discounting contexts, 
the rationale of Brooke Group should hold even in the monopoly context.96 
One additional question that arises is a more focused issue, whether all types of 
bundled discounts are likely to foreclose competition.97 This issue ties into Ortho, which 
 
94 See supra Section 2.2.  
95 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES 
AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶768b2, at 150 (2d ed. 2002); But cf. id. at 149-50 (“For single-item discounts, no 
matter how measured or aggregated, injury to an equally efficient rival seems implausible.”).  
96 This explains the result in Concord Boat that upheld a monopolist’s discount when bundled discounts did 
not exist.  
97 See LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 175 (noting that the Smithkline linkage approach required a similar inquiry); 
James A. Keyte, LePage’s v. 3M – More Questions than Answers for the Lawful “Monopolist,”
ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 27 (highlighting the dissent’s schism with the majority and with the 
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held that discounting above the monopolist’s competitor’s cost was not anticompetitive, 
since there was no possibility of eliminating an equally efficient competitor.98 
From the point of view of economic theory, the Ortho Court’s legal analysis of 
bundled discounts in the monopoly context makes sense for the following reasons.  A 
competitor who is not and will not be foreclosed can always match the monopolist’s 
prices, since its pricing must logically be above marginal cost.  Such a situation 
eliminates the possibility of the only anticompetitive effect that can result from 
discounting.99 This will have the effect of at least temporarily lowering prices and 
increasing competition, despite the monopolist’s malignant purpose.100 Thus, one might 
argue that the broad principles of Atlantic Richfield and Brooke Group apply to above 
cost discounting that is also above the competitor’s cost:  “Low prices benefit consumers 
. . . and . . . do not threaten competition. . . .”101 Moreover, Brooke Group would assert 
that the cost of wrong judgments is too high in this scenario, since competition is not 
being decreased.102 
How Brooke Group might apply to monopolist above cost discounting ultimately 
depends on if one reads it as applying to any discounting context where injury to 
competition is unlikely.  Brooke Group, after all, never said that it would evaluate every 
possible permutation of oligopoly sub-contexts in order to determine whether injury to 
competition was likely.  On the other hand, there is no literature to suggest that the 
 
Smithkline competition inquiry); Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 
455, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
98 Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. , 920 F. Supp. at 465. 
99 See supra text accompanying note 96.  
100 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993) (“Even an act 
of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, state a claim under the 
federal antitrust laws. . . .”).  
101 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990).  
102 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993) (noting that 
discounting was the mechanism of competition).  
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oligopoly context required such a multi-tiered analysis.  The monopoly context is 
different because discounting dangers fade out and reappear at various points.   
For example, at the broadest metaphysical level, anticompetitive effects are 
surprisingly unlikely in the monopoly context as a whole.103 At a more particular level, 
that of bundled discounts within monopolies, competitive injury is likely.104 Finally, at 
an even more particular level, that of bundled discounts that are priced above competitor 
cost, competitive injury is again unlikely.105 This is visually illustrated in Figure 1.106 
The current U.S. court jurisprudence is unclear.  No Court has analyzed 
monopolist discounting by looking at the monopoly context as a whole, though Brooke 
Group might suggest this approach, since discounting in the monopoly context as a whole 
will generally lead to competitive results.  The LePage’s Court, however, looked at the 
likelihood of competitive injury in the bundled discount context.  Finally, the Ortho 
Court and the LePage’s dissent analyzed the likelihood of competitive injury in the above 
cost bundled discount context.107 
Depending on the level of abstraction at which this analysis is applied, i.e., 
whether it is applied in the monopoly context by itself or in the above competitor cost 
monopoly context, above-cost prices could potentially be either a defense in certain cases 
or a total defense in monopoly discounting under Brooke Group. Applying likelihood 
analysis on more and more particular levels will lead to increasingly murky 
 
103 See Concod Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (2000); Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶768b2, 
at 149-50 (2d ed. 2002)  (noting that anticompetitive effects are only likely in the bundled discount 
context).  
104 See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶768b2, at 149-50 (2d ed. 2002).  
105 See Ortho Diagnostic Systems, 920 F. Supp. at 465. 
106 See infra Figure 1, at 20.  
107 LePage’s, 324 F.3d 141, at 175 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (requiring a showing of how much LePage’s 
would have had to cut its prices).  
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predictability.  However, if Brooke Group applies beyond the oligopoly context, the 
Supreme Court should decide at which levels this analysis applies and not extend it too 
far to make it unwieldy. 
This would be a daunting task, since the facts arguably change the probability of 
the analysis.  For example, in LePage’s, the Court likely analogized bundled discounts to 
tying in part due to the additional element of target growth rates.  Applying Brooke 
Group thus has the danger of precluding judicial flexibility.  The counter-argument is that 
if no other type of discounting is potentially anti-competitive, then the law should reflect 
that any discount that is above competitor cost is competitive.108 This, in turn, means that 
the Supreme Court should at least provide the monopolist defendant with an affirmative 
defense that his pricing was above competitor cost.  In fact, given the potential consumer 
benefit of discounting above competitor cost, the Supreme Court should probably require 
plaintiff to prove that the monopolist’s pricing was below her cost and that she was 
efficient enough to compete on a product-by-product basis.109 
108 See Aaron S, Edlin, Stopping Above Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941 (2002) (arguing that 
discounting above monopolist cost but below competitor cost will eliminate competitors); B.S. Yamey, 
Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15 J.L. & ECON. 129 (1972); Einer Elhaunge, Why Above-
Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory – and the Implications for Defining Costs and 
Market Power, 112 Yale L.J. 681, 697 n. 52 (2003) (suggesting that above-cost fidelity discounts can raise 
competitor’s costs and function as exclusive dealings).  However, in the monopoly context, it is quite likely 
that a monopolist will have cost advantages.  See John Temple Lange & Robert O’Donoghue, Defining 
Legitimate Competition: How to Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82 EC, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 83 
(2002).  It should also be noted that exclusive agreements could still render such discounting anti-
competitive, but exclusive agreements can be dealt with under traditional Section 2 analysis.  
109 Ortho suggests the efficiency prong of this approach.  See Ortho Diagnostic Systems, 920 F. Supp. at 
469 (“[A] monopolist . . . must allege and prove either that (a) the monopolist has priced below its average 
variable cost or (b) the plaintiff is at least as efficient a producer of the competitive product as the 
defendant, but that the defendant’s pricing makes it unprofitable for the plaintiff to continue to produce.”).   
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After relating and applying broad Section 2 principles, the LePage’s Court tried to 
find additional reasons why Brooke Group should not apply.  First, it noted that 
recoupment was possible in this case, unlike in Brooke Group.110 Second, it tried to limit 
 
110 LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 151.  
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Brooke Group to the oligopoly context.111 Third, it noted that LePage’s had never 
asserted a predatory pricing claim.112 
The possibility of recoupment is by itself irrelevant, since extending Brooke 
Group would require below cost pricing as well as recoupment.  Only if the below cost 
pricing prong is not needed in a given monopoly context does this distinguishing matter.  
In addition, one cannot distinguish this case from Brooke Group merely on the basis of 
the inherent differences between the oligopoly and the monopoly context.  First, the 
Concord Boat Court, without even flinching, applied Brooke Group to the monopoly 
fidelity rebate context, outside of the bundled discount sub-context.113 Second, the Ortho 
Court applied a Brooke Group-like analysis even within the bundled discount sub-
context, when the monopolist did not price above her competitor’s cost.  These 
approaches are consistent with the broad language of Brooke Group and Atlantic 
Richfield.114 The Concord Boat Court additionally noted that its approach is correct 
because Matsushita and Brooke Group placed an emphasis on the “actual facts or 
realities of the marketplace.”115 Outside of the bundled discount context, there is simply 
no danger under U.S. efficiency notions to competition from discounting, monopoly 
context or not.  Moreover, even within the bundled discount context, as noted above, the 
danger is not absolute and should therefore be ascertained with regard to the “actual 
facts.” 
 
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunwswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (2000) (noting that Courts had never 
refused to apply Brooke Group to the monopoly context apart from the sub-context of bundled discounts, or 
linkage).  
114 See supra Section 2.2.  
115 Concord Boat, 207 F.3d. at 1062.  
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The fact that LePage’s never asserted a predatory pricing claim should also have 
no bearing on the monopolization analysis.  The Ortho Court previously addressed this 
question in a footnote and explained that what is relevant in Section 2 cases is whether 
conduct transgresses the monopolization, attempted monopolization or leveraging 
standard.116 This view seems correct as the alleged violation is Section 2, not a specific 
predatory pricing statute.  Predation is the sole mode of analysis, rather than broad 
Section 2 principles, by which certain monopolization conduct117 should be narrowly 
evaluated when there is discounting that is either not likely to be anticompetitive, or 
raises issues that are as a practical matter of economy too difficult for the judiciary.118 
In the next increment of its opinion, the LePage’s Court consulted an array of 
primarily court of appeals’ decisions in order to determine what type of conduct could be 
said to be “exclusionary or anticompetitive” under Section 2.119 In sum, the basic point 
that the LePage’s Court noted was that any action by a monopolist to drive competitors 
from the market violated Section 2.  This is illustrated by how “[e]ven unfair tortious 
conduct unrelated to a monopolist’s pricing policies [had] been held to violate § 2.”120 In 
particular, it cited the Sixth Circuit Conwood case that found a Section 2 violation where 
a monopolist essentially physically wreaked havoc on its competitor’s products in stores 
by removing their product racks.121 Conwood is an interesting Section 2 case.  However, 
 
116 Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 468 n. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (“As indicated above, Ortho must adduce evidence sufficient to ground a conclusion that the pricing 
should be condemned, whatever adjective may be applied.  In the Court’s view, the standard discussed in 
the text – pricing that could drive a more efficient competitor from the marketplace – is that which 
separates legitimate from illegitimate competition.  Whether such behavior is characterized as ‘predatory’ 
is quite beside the point.”).  
117 For an inquiry regarding which monopoly conduct should be analyzed in this way, see supra Figure 1.  
118 See supra Section 2.2.  
119 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 152 (3d Cir. 2003). 
120 Id. at 153.  
121 Id. (citing Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002)).  
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as the LePage’s Court itself noted, it did not take place in the pricing context.  In the non-
pricing context, exclusionary conduct by itself is sufficient to impose antitrust liability, 
whether or not actual foreclosure is likely to occur, since there is no countervailing 
consumer benefit.  In a discounting context, however, as has been shown above, a 
different analysis is required.   
After considering the exclusionary conduct case law, the LePage’s Court turned 
its attention to the economic theory of bundled discounts and to its own Third Circuit 
precedent in Smithkline.122 It analogized the bundled discounts to tying and suggested 
that customers would buy from 3M only to receive a greater discount on a product that 
LePage’s did not produce, not due to the quality or price of 3M’s products.123 The Court, 
however, neglected to consider, as mentioned above, that discounting above competitor 
cost cannot have anticompetitive effects.124 If the victim competitor can likely still 
compete, then nothing limits Brooke Group’s presumption that lower prices drives free 
competition.125 
The LePage’s Court’s reliance on Smithkline is also misplaced.  First, as already 
noted, the plaintiff in Smithkline, as in Ortho, proved that it was unable to match 
prices.126 In the pricing context, due to the confluence of case law and economic theory 
regarding consumer benefit from discounting, this is absolutely essential.  Any other rule 
protects competitors at the expense of competition. 
 
122 See id. at 154-57.  
123 See id. at 155 (citing Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 794, at 83 (Supp. 
2002)) (“In the anticompetitive case, which we presume is in the minority, the defendant rewards the 
customer for buying its product B rather than the plaintiff’s B, not because defendant’s B is better or even 
cheaper.  Rather, the customer buys the defendant’s B in order to receive a greater discount on A, which the 
plaintiff does not produce.”).  
124 See supra text accompanying note 109.  
125 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993).  
126 See supra note 97.  
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Even aside from contemporary Supreme Court precedent and economic theory, 
the LePage’s decision is arguably at odds with Smithkline. The LePage’s Court 
summarily concluded that “3M bundled its rebates for Scotch-brand tape with other 
products it sold in much the same way that Lilly bundled its rebates for Kefzol with 
Keflin and Keflex.”127 This is not entirely accurate.  Lilly used its monopoly in Keflin 
and Keflex to force customers to buy Kefzol instead of its competitor’s Ancef.  If 3M 
used its monopoly power, it was to force customers of non-transparent tape product lines 
to buy 3M products instead of those of its competitors.  It is not clear therefore how 3M 
could have linked its competitive product with LePage’s within the meaning of 
Smtihklline. Certainly, if linking existed, it is dubious whether it was the type of linkage 
that “directly affected the price, supply, and demand” of LePage’s product.128 
Rather, it seems any such effect would have been indirect, since purchasing 
private label tape was not directly tied into the purchase of branded tape.  To the extent 
that 3M’s discounted bundling scheme required purchasing LePage’s substitutes, it was 
only by virtue of non-monopolized products in other lines.  This was arguably merely 
linking a competitive product with a non-competitive product, a question that Smithkline 
did not necessarily address.   
After considering whether the bundled discounts were anticompetitive, the Court 
proceeded to consider whether there were exclusive dealing contracts.129 3M argued that 
it had not engaged in exclusive dealing because only two of its contracts were expressly 
exclusive and because its agreements were not found to rise to the level of exclusivity 
 
127 Id. at 156.  
128 Smithkline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
129 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 157 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
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required under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.130 The Court, however, asserted that 
exclusivity could also be an element of a Section 2 monopolization claim and that 
contracts could be exclusive even when not expressly exclusive.131 
The relationship between bundled discounts and exclusive contracts is an 
extremely difficult one.  On the one hand, one could argue that exclusive contracts that 
relate to price should be analyzed under the same Brooke Group framework, since they 
are part of the pricing context.  However, it seems correct to assert that exclusive 
contracts should be analyzed under more general Section 2 principles, since they do not 
pertain to discounting as such.132 In other words, inevitable conflicts between the pricing 
context and Aspen should be resolved by ascertaining whether the nexus between the 
exclusive contract and the discounting is not sufficiently strong.133 Relationships 
between a supplier and a customer where the customer is not literally coerced should 
generally be analyzed as having a nexus to discounting as such.  If the nexus is not 
sufficient, however, then any exclusive conduct should be analyzed under a Section 2 
rule of reason approach and subject to a justification defense.134 
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Specifically, they should be analyzed under the Aspen framework that inquires as to whether conduct is 
exclusionary or is justified by exclusionary conduct.  See Mark R. Patterson, The Sacrifice of Profits in 
Non-Price Predation, ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 37 (noting that the monopolization standard is clear in 
the non-price context).  
133 This is concededly a murky concept, but some line must admittedly be drawn between genuine 
discounts that provide customers with incentives versus discounts that coerce customers.  See Brunswick 
Corp., 207 F.3d at 1062-63 (rejecting a plaintiff’s exclusive agreement claim where it was possible for 
customers to deal with competitors); See Kenneth L. Glazer and Brian R. Henry, Coercive v. Incentivizing 
Conduct: A Way Out of the Section 2 Impasse?, ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 49 (arguing that genuinely 
incentivizing conduct that gives the customer a choice and lowers his cost should not be penalized under 
the antitrust laws).  
134 See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶1802c, at 62 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that the preconditions for 
competitive harm in exclusive dealings are that the dealings cover a “significant portion of the downstream 
market,” that there are “entry barriers or equivalent impediments” restricting the entry of potential 
competitors in the upstream market, and that there is “resulting prolongation of the dominant firm’s ability 
to earn monopoly profits in the downstream market.”); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
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If there is not a sufficient nexus between exclusionary contracts and discounting, 
one must ask what constitutes an exclusionary contract.  The LePage’s Court cited 
Tampa Electric for the proposition that exclusionary contracts were those that 
“effectively foreclosed the business of competitors.”135 Tampa Electric, however, 
involved a twenty year contract with no termination provision, which would preclude a 
customer from seeking better prices if the contract covered her supply requirements.136 
In LePage’s, however, there was no evidence that 3M customers could not generally 
forego the rebates and purchase from LePage’s.137 If the monopolist’s customer is not 
locked into the monopolist’s supply on a prolonged basis, then there is less reason to find 
an exclusive contract in any fidelity discount context.138 
The LePage’s Court finally proceeded to consider whether the 3M’s exclusionary 
conduct was anticompetitive and suggested that a monopolist’s conduct was 
anticompetiive if the monopolist excluded a “competitor . . . from the essential facilities 
that would permit it to achieve the efficiencies of scale necessary to threaten the 
monopoly.”139 On the discounting aspect by itself, Microsoft should not apply if it flies 
in the face of Brooke Group. The exclusionary conduct aspect beyond mere discounting 
 
472 U.S. 585, 595, 605 (1985) (discussing the “valid business reasons” justification defense and the 
analysis for exclusionary conduct).  
135 Id. (citing Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)).  
136 See Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 320.  
137 Other than the two express exclusive contracts, the evidence is very sparse.  K-Mart’s statement that it 
could not deal with LePage’s for three years did not necessarily indicate exclusive dealing, since K-Mart 
might have merely thought that LePage’s would refuse to match 3M’s rebates.  If 3M’s price was above 
LePage’s cost, then the antitrust laws should not protect LePage’s refusal to match 3M’s price merely 
because it was too painful.  In this situation, to protect LePage’s would be to protect a competitor over 
competition.    
138 This approach conforms to that of the 8th and 9th Circuits.  See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 
207 F.3d 1039, 1062-63 (8th Cir. 2000) (not finding exclusive dealing where customers could purchase up 
to 40% from the monopolist’s competitors); Western Parcel Express v. United Parcel Serv. Of Am., Inc., 
190 F.3d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 1999) (not finding exclusive dealing where a volume discount contract was 
terminable at will and did not prevent customers from dealings with competitors).   
139 Lepage’s, 324 F.3d at 159 (citing U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).  
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presents a more difficult issue, but Microsoft ultimately should not apply in the 
discounting context in the absence of exclusionary contracts.  If there are no exclusionary 
contracts, i.e., if the nexus between the discount and the conduct is sufficiently strong, 
then the discount should be analyzed under the proposed Brooke Group framework.140 
However, if there actually were exclusive contracts in LePage’s, then nothing bars 
application of Microsoft.
2. ABOVE COST MONOPOLIST DISCOUNTING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
2.1. Introduction to EC Competition Law 
Unlike in the United States, the issue of monopolist discount schemes is starkly 
simple in the EC.  The Head of Unit at the Directorate General for Competition of the 
European Commission recently summarized the state of the law as follows:  “One usually 
refers to ‘fidelity’ or ‘loyalty’ rebates to denote the discounting practices which may raise 
antitrust concerns under Art. 82 E.C. Treaty or Section 2 of the Sherman Act and to 
‘quantity’ rebates to describe the lawful discounting practices.”141 
Nonetheless, on a more detailed plane, all monopolist discounting issues are dealt 
with under Article 82 of the EC Treaty.  Article 82 contains a list of “abuses” that is non-
exhaustive.142 It reads:  
 Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States.  
 
Such abuse may, in particular consist in:  
 
140 See supra Figure 1, at 20.  
141 Luc Gyselen, Rebates: Competition on the Merits or Exclusionary Practice?, in European Competition 
Law Annual: What is Abuse of a Dominant Position (Winter 2003/2004), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_017_en.pdf.
142 See John Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition: How to Clarify Pricing Abuses under Article 
82 EC, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 83, 125 (2002) (noting that the EC Commission has stated that the list is 
illustrative).  
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(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;  
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according 
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts.143 
However, since the list is non-exhaustive, the EC has the power to find abuses in 
discounting decisions on broader criteria beyond Article 82’s enumerations.  The Court 
of First Instance144 stated in Tetra Pak: “Article 86 [now Article 82] covers all conduct 
of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to hinder the maintenance or 
growth of the degree of competition still existing in a market where, as a result of the 
very presence of that undertaking, competition is weakened.”145 A dominant position 
was defined in LaRoche, a previous case, as a position of economic strength that allows a 
firm to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors.146 
The broad inquiry is therefore similar to Section 2 analysis in that neither 
dominant position analysis nor monopoly analysis prohibits such a position, absent 
evidence that the position was used to diminish competition.  Nevertheless, the 
application of abuse of dominant position analysis in the EC has yielded results in the 
discounting context that are often at odds with U.S. monopolization analysis.  In the next 
three sections, this Paper considers how the EC has applied Article 82 in both the below-
cost and above-cost discounting context in non-fidelity, fidelity, and bundled rebates. 
 
143 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Dec. 24, 2002, art. 43, O.J. (C 325/65) (2002).  
144 Antitrust cases in the EC are initially argued before the EC Commission.  The Court of First Instance is 
the first level appellate Court.  
145 Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission of the European Communities, 1994 E.C.R. II-
827, para. 114 (citing Hoffman-La Roche, 1979 E.C.R. 461).  
146 Case 85/76, Hoffman-LaRoche & Co. v. Comm., at para. 38 
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2.2. Hoffman-LaRoche 
LaRoche was the first EC case to deal with the same question as was presented in 
LePage’s, the question of bundled discounts.  On appeal, the Court of Justice, the highest 
Court in the EC, found that LaRoche had a dominant position in all of the bundled 
markets.  These were vitamins A, B2, B3, B6, C, E, and H.147 It furthermore proceeded 
to find that LaRoche had abused its dominant position on two bases, exclusive contracts 
and fidelity rebates that gave customers the incentive to deal exclusively with 
LaRoche.148 
The Court of Justice149 then gave its reasons for its condemnation of bundled 
discounts.  First, it focused on the intent to prevent customers from obtaining supplies 
from competing producers.   It implied that this was problematic because it was “different 
from [methods of competition] which condition normal competition in products or 
services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators” and thus had the effect 
of hindering competition.150 Second, the Court of Justice also noted that the effect of the 
bundled discounts would be to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions, 
disadvantaging customers that did not participate.151 This in itself ran afoul of Article 
82(c) of the EC Treaty. 
LaRoche thus had the effect of firmly prohibiting bundled discounts in the EC as 
early as 1978.  However, in the following years, Areeda & Turner’s economic analysis of 
above-cost discounting spread to the EC.  These changes suggested a potential change in 
how the EC would view bundled discounts.  
 
147 See id. at para. 1.  
148 Id. at para. 80.  
149 The Court of Justice is the highest level appellate court in the EC.  
150 Case 85/76, Hoffman-LaRoche & Co. v. Comm., at paras. 90-91.  
151 Id. at para. 90.  
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2.3. AKZO  
The case that laid the groundwork for a distinction between below-cost 
discounting and above-cost discounting is AKZO/ECS,152 which was handed down by the 
EC Commission.  AKZO was a monopolist in the organic peroxides, while ECS was an 
up and coming competitor in the flour additive segment of organic peroxides.153 AKZO 
threatened ECS to force it from the market and subsequently engaged in below cost 
pricing in the flour additive segment.154 The Commission, based primarily on the 
strategic objective of price cutting alone, ruled for ECS.155 
The Court of Justice, however, heavily influenced by Areeda & Turner, decided 
there should be a separate analysis for below-cost and above-cost discounting.156 Thus, it 
held that discounting below cost was presumptively predatory, while discounting above 
cost was predatory if there was a plan by a dominant firm to eliminate a competitor.157 
AKZO had similar economic concerns to the Brooke Group Court in the United 
States.  Brooke Group, however, unlike AKZO, patently suggested that above-cost 
discounting would not violate antitrust law at least under certain conditions.158 The 
Concord Boat Court thus essentially extended Brooke Group to monopolists outside of 
the bundled discount context.  And although LePage’s so far limits a further extension, it 
is entirely conceivable that the Supreme Court, if it grants certiorari, might apply Brooke 
 
152 Commission Decision No. 85/609/EEC, O.J. L 374/1 (1985).  
153 See John Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition: How to Clarify Pricing Abuses under Article 
82 EC, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 83, 125 (2002).  
154 See id.
155 See id. at 126.  
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 Brooke Group, unlike the EC Court of Justice, also requires a showing of recoupment when there is 
below-cost pricing.  Compare Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 
(1993) with Tetra Pak, 1991 E.C.R. II-1483 at para. 100 (holding that recoupment was not required under 
Article 82).  
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Group in the bundled discount context when a monopolist’s product is priced above 
competitor cost.159 Subsequent European Courts, as shown below, nevertheless heavily 
limited AKZO and found reasons why the above-cost framework should not apply.  
2.4. Above-Cost Discounting After AKZO 
In Hilti, the Commission asserted that a case of monopolist above-cost 
discounting did “not hinge on whether the prices were blow costs. . . .”160 Hilti was a nail 
gun and nail manufacturer that engaged in selective discounts aimed at stopping 
competitors’ customers from purchasing competitor nails.161 Its means namely included 
tying, bundled discounts, inducing dealers not to fulfill orders, and selective pricing.162 
The Court primarily found these practices to be an abuse because of Hilti’s “attempts to 
prevent or limit the entry of independent producers of Hilti-compatible consumables into 
these markets.”163 
Subsequently, in Irish Sugar, the Court made it plainly clear that even single line 
above-cost market share and target rebates would not be tolerated in the non-bundled 
context.  Both rebates were essentially rejected because they were not “normal quantity 
discount[s]” and had the “effect of tying a customer to the dominant supplier.”164 
Clearly, the European Courts, as shown in Irish Sugar, have a different 
understanding of tying a customer to a dominant supplier than the U.S. courts.  In 
Concord Boat, the theory of “golden handcuffs” was rejected as long as an agreement did 
 
159 See supra Section 2.5.  
160 See Commission Decision No. 88/138/EEC, O.J. L65 (1987) [Hilti].  
161 See John Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition: How to Clarify Pricing Abuses under Article 
82 EC, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 83, 127 (2002). 
162 Id. at 128.  
163 See Commission Decision No. 88/138/EEC, O.J. L65, at para. 74 (1987) [Hilti].  
164 See Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar plc v. Comm., 1999 E.C.R. II-2969 (1999), at para. 194, 203.  
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not by its terms prevent a customer from dealing with a competitor.165 Nonetheless, it is 
now settled European law that non-quantitative based discounting will run afoul of 
Article 82 simply because it provides an incentive to deal exclusively with the 
monopolist, regardless of whether it is above-cost.166 
3. CONCLUSION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
The U.S. and the EC are not so different in their rationales.  As has already been 
shown, both the U.S. and the EC deal with above-cost monopolist discounting by broadly 
prohibiting conduct that will result in a diminution of competition.  The broad economic 
rationale in both the U.S. and the EC is also similar.  In attempting to clarify outstanding 
ambiguities regarding EC discounting law, the Commission recently stated that the 
enforcer’s intervention in discounting is tricky “because it is inspired by faith in 
competition as a process of rivalry between competitors and in this process’ contribution 
to customer and consumer welfare in the longer run.  This ‘faith’ should not be of the 
religion kind but have sound economic underpinnings.  If not, the enforcer might end up 
protecting one or more competitors in rivalry rather than the structural process of rivalry 
between all of them.”167 This obviously echoes what the U.S. Supreme Court has itself 
often stated.168 
Furthermore, the Commission has stated that in its view “dominant companies 
will be living dangerously under Art. 82 when they offer prices which equally efficient 
 
165 See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1062-63 (2000) (discrediting a golden 
handcuff theory when customers are merely incentivized and can walk away at any time).  
166 See Einer Elhaunge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L Rev. 252, 256-57 (2003) 
(“[U]sing above-cost prices cuts to drive out rivals [] has been labeled ‘competition on the merits’ in the 
United States but not ‘normal competition’ in Europe.”).  
167 Gyselen paper p. 5 
168 See Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (noting that antitrust laws were passed for “the 
protection of competition, not competitors”).  
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rival competitors cannot match.”169 These words appear similar to the logic that has 
driven the U.S. position that single line discounts are always acceptable, absent an 
exclusive contract.170 This economic rationale is that:  “For single-item discounts, no 
matter how measured or aggregated, injury to an equally efficient rival seems 
implausible.”171 Nevertheless, the EC and the U.S. results curiously diverge, particularly 
in the area of above-cost single line non-bundled fidelity rebates.172 This divergence is 
visually illustrated below.  
United States  EC 
Allowed. Quantitative Discount Allowed. 
Allowed. See Concord 
Boat.
Non-Bundled Fidelity 
Discount 
Not Allowed. See Irish 
Sugar.
Not Allowed, but Supreme 
Court could in the future 
conceivably allow in certain 
cases under Brooke Group.
Bundled Discount Not Allowed. See LaRoche.
If the rationale is to avoid eliminating equally efficient competitors in both the 
U.S. and the EC, the only explanation for the divergence is that the U.S. and the EC have 
different ideas about what it means to eliminate an equally efficient competitor.  In the 
EC, case law suggests that only quantitative based discounting does not eliminate equally 
efficient competitors.  It also suggests, after Irish Sugar, that quantitative based 
discounting is discounting that does not incentivize a customer to deal exclusively with a 
monopolist.  The implication in efficiency terms is that a competitor of a monopolist is 
not less efficient than the monopolist because he cannot similarly incentivize his 
customers.  Under U.S law, however, it would be assumed in a single line context that 
 
169 Id.
170 See Concoard Boat, 207 F.3d 1039.  
171 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES 
AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶768b2, at 149-50 (2d ed. 2002). 
172 Compare Concord Boat, 207 F.3d 1039, with Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar plc v. Comm., 1999 E.C.R. II-
2969 (1999).  
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such a competitor was not equally efficient.  In other words, U.S. law assumes that 
competitors should be able to compete with the monopolist in a single context, 
notwithstanding any qualities inhering in monopoly itself.  Any such inherent qualities, 
under U.S. law, are implicitly viewed as efficiencies.173 
The EC view, however, cannot help but imply that there is some evil inhering in 
the monopoly itself that ultimately makes it less efficient, since an inability to compete in 
single line non-bundled fidelity discounts can only stem from a tangible efficiency.  This 
view is perhaps rooted in the fact that few monopolies were historically acquired through 
skill or ingenuity, but were “created by regulations, government subsidies, or permitted 
combinations. . . .”174 Regardless of the origin of the view, it implies that somehow or 
other, despite immediate operational efficiencies, monopolist discounting that 
incentivizes loyalty will end up crushing competitors to the detriment of competition. 
Efficiency in the EC thus obtains a profoundly historical sense.  The efficiency of 
size, if it exists, does not exceed the efficiency of time.  Although different from the U.S. 
 
173 For broader evidence of this phenomenon, consider the debate between the EC and the U.S. over the 
GE/Honeywell Merger.  Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James remarked:  
 
We concluded that the merger firm would have offered improved products at more attractive 
prices than either firm could have offered on its own, and that the merged firm’s competitors 
would then have had a great incentive to improve their own product offerings.  This, to us, is the 
very essence of competition, and no principal is more central to U.S. law than that antitrust 
protects competition, not competitors. 
 
In stark contrast, the EC focused on how the merger would affect European and US competitors, 
essentially concluding that the very efficiencies and lower prices the transaction would produce 
would be anticompetitive because they might ultimately drive some of these competitors from the 
market or reduce their market shares to a point where they could not longer compete effectively.  
In other words, the EC determined that the fact that customers would be ‘induced’ to purchase 
more attractive and lower-priced GE/Honeywell products, rather than those of its competitors, was 
a bad thing of a sort that its antitrust law ought to prohibit.  
Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US DoJ, International Antitrust in 
the 21st Century: Cooperation and Convergence, Address Before the OECD Global Forum on 
Competition, Paris, France, 17 Oct. 2001, available at 
http://www.howrey.com/docs/AT_RevAmericas2004_private.pdf.   
174 Einer Elhaunge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L Rev. 252, 307 (2003) (noting 
that the EC generally imposes more duties on monopolists than the U.S. does).  
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view, the EC view seems to be based in solid economic theory.  The ultimate resolution 
between the two views is more metaphysical than economic, since it is ultimately 
impossible to know which efficiency is greater.  On the one hand, EC law might 
foreclose synthesized progressive efforts that are intimately tied to size.  On the other 
hand, U.S. law might foreclose the struggle that is also essential to progress.  
As for the uncertainty in the U.S. regarding bundled discounts, the comparison 
between EC and U.S. law over non-bundled above-cost discounts helps to remind us that 
the efficiency rationale used by U.S. economists and implicit in Brooke Group and 
Concord Boat is functionally normative.  At the same time, it lends support for the 
argument previously advanced in this Paper that U.S. law should incorporate an element 
into the bundled discount context that requires a plaintiff to show that he was equally 
efficient and that the total discount did not fall below the competitor cost, if the Supreme 
Court essentially upholds the reasoning in LePage’s that implies that monopolist 
competitors should not be expected to compete at the bundled discount level.  This 
efficiency showing should be required because U.S. law does categorically expect the 
efficient non-monopolist to be able to compete on its own in single line contexts.  The 
above competitor cost showing should be required because U.S. law does expect 
companies to be able to compete when it is possible.  In sum, it is fundamentally 
inconceivable under U.S. conceptions of efficiency and the logic of size175 that a 
company could not compete with a countervailing incentive plan when the monopolist 
prices above the competitor cost, absent a genuine exclusive agreement.  
 
175 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979) (suggesting that a 
monopolist could “utilize the advantages of size”).  
